Why Missouri’s 3-point defense looks the way it does

Any scouting report Missouri assembled ahead of Braggin’ Rights could have made a reasonable tradeoff: quarantine the lane and force Illinois to scratch out a living from long range.

Coming in, the Illini’s shooting clip off the catch lagged behind the national average, and Brad Underwood’s squad had only shot better than 35 percent twice in non-conference play. His key cogs – Kylan Boswell, Andrej Stojaković, and David Mirković – thrived when playing downhill.

Then, reality drubbed theory inside the Enterprise Center.

Keaton Wagler made an early habit of canning open looks after MU failed to secure rebounds. And early in the second half, the Ivišić brothers, who had struggled at times to stretch the floor, suddenly dialed in their shooting strokes to punish the Tigers on pick-and-pops. When it was over, Illinois drilled 15 three-balls on its way to a record-setting romp against the Tigers.

The bombardment also dropped MU to 304^th nationally in defending the three-point stripe. It also resurrected a familiar gripe: Why are Dennis Gates’ squads perpetually strafed from beyond the arc?

Over four seasons, those struggles have always been easy to spot — and to criticize. But the patterns aren’t rooted in slipshod focus or lazy closeouts. They stem from deliberate structural choices that prioritize sealing off the paint and limiting shots at the rim, even if that means living with some open looks from deep. Whether that compromise remains tenable — especially as SEC play arrives — is the real question as the Tigers try to steady a season that’s veered into choppy waters.

Let’s start by looking at what MU is comfortable allowing and what it puts up resistance.

Early in Gates’ tenure, the Tigers had a basic modus operandi: force turnovers. Lots of them. They created runouts and high-value rim attempts. Selling out for takeaways, however, taxes your defensive shell – allowing open jumpers. Off-ball defenders with a license to gamble aren’t always in great rebounding position, either. So, there are second possessions.

Yes, those threes and putbacks are infuriating. But if your team is wreaking enough havoc – and bleeding enough possessions – they’re simply futile attempts by an opponent to backfill. And when your roster is still heavily populated by up transfers from mid-major programs, risks are required to offset a talent gap.

That approach worked splendidly in Gates’ maiden campaign and last season. Less so in his second season. However, there were subtle shifts as Gates steadily improved the caliber of players he brought to Columbia. And, theoretically, MU could ease its risk tolerance.

We also need to draw an important distinction – defending the three-point line is defined by randomness. There’s also no statistical relationship between how many open threes a high-major team allows and their opponent’s ability to cash them in. Need evidence? The chart below shows shot volume and efficiency during the four seasons of Gates’ tenure. The dots are simply strewn across the plot.

It’s also worth plotting the relationship between the points teams allow on unguarded three-balls and their adjusted defensive efficiency. There is a weak relationship, but opponents’ long-range efforts only explain changes in overall efficiency 6.8 percent of the time. It barely moves the needle.

Look at where MU sits in that plot. Its adjusted defensive efficiency is essentially the same in three seasons, but what the Tigers allow on unguarded threes taken off the catch varies. Meanwhile, the Tigers ranked 68^th in adjusted defensive efficiency last season and 181^st in 2024 – despite opponents performing roughly the same from deep.

Defensive effectiveness starts with a team’s ability to prevent easy two-pointers. There’s a moderate statistical relationship between the number of points a team allows on rim attempts and its adjusted defensive efficiency. Plotting it for high-major teams over the past four seasons shows a clear direction of travel.

Using Synergy Sports’ possession data, we can also see MU has improved at defending the rim each of the past four seasons.

• 2022-23: 1.231 PPP (No. 270)
• 2023-24: 1.242 PPP (No. 306)
• 2024-25: 1.194 PPP (No. 212)
• 2025-26: 1.068 PPP (No. 44)

That brings us to an important caveat. Your method of rim deterrence matters. Teams that can prevent layups and dunks without relying heavily on help defense should expect their three-point defense to look better. MU’s three losses have come against teams embodying that observation.

And the Tigers?

Well, not so much.

This season, MU’s roster boasts more size and length, but the Tigers rarely extend their defense to apply heavy backcourt pressure or trap in the half-court. Instead, MU leverages that physical profile to cordon off the paint. Yet the Tigers do rely on aggressive help defense to keep it water tight.

Clogging up gaps and obstructing vision needed for passing reads can be a boon – but it also risks stressing your defensive shell and putting off-ball defenders on tilt. And that’s what unfolded throughout non-conference play.

Through 13 games, MU allowed opponents to hoist up 68 unguarded three-pointers off the catch. Half of those attempts stemmed from a Tiger over-helping and getting caught out. All of the numbers start to make some semblance of sense when you see how MU’s chooses to help.  

Often, unguarded jumpers occur when a Tiger over-rotates toward the midline, an invisible point of demarcation dividing the strong and weak sides of the floor. At times, a big man is slow to recover back to the paint, forcing a guard to take more time “tagging” a roller. The result: an easy skip pass or kickout to an unattended shooter in the corner.

In other cases, the on-ball defender lags fighting over a screen, allowing their man to reach the lane. The same low helper — T.O. Barrett in the clip series — slides over to deter a rim attempt. The passing read is simple. After Missouri’s win over Alabama State, Dennis Gates noted that Mizzou’s guards can stray too far, wind up more than a pass away, and leave themselves with nothing but a fly-by contest.

For now, the Tigers have been somewhat fortunate. Opponents are converting just 33.3 percent of those looks, slightly below the Division I median.

The same can’t be said when help comes from the nail. In the sequences below, a primary defender does their job — sitting down, sliding, and cutting off the drive — only for a teammate to stunt into the gap and swipe at the ball. Again, the read is uncomplicated. The handler kicks it out to an open shooter in the slot.

Mizzou has also surrendered open threes when a guard sinks too far toward the baseline, flattens the shell, and leaves their assignment uncovered. Even quick reactions often aren’t enough. There’s simply too much ground to cover.

If you watch closely, you’ll notice Barrett and Sebastian Mack frequently serving as the helpers. That’s understandable, given that Anthony Robinson II’s primary task is to check an opponent’s top creator. And to Mack’s credit, he’s been excellent on the ball, allowing just 0.583 PPP combined on pick-and-rolls, handoffs, and isolations. Barrett has been similarly reliable.

From an optimistic lens, the path forward is restraint.

What’s more surprising is Mark Mitchell’s role in conceding 14 open threes, which opponents have hit at a 64.3 percentclip. The causes vary, but they highlight recurring issues for Missouri’s frontcourt.

Aggressive ball-screen coverage creates long recoveries — first to the lane, then back out to shooters. Illinois was a prime example. The Illini’s bigs preferred to flare and pop, forcing forwards to slide with the dribbler until help arrives. Savvy handlers then take an extra bounce, stretching the recovery just enough to free a shooter.

Earlier in non-conference play, Missouri’s preference for jumbo lineups compounded the issue. Mitchell, Jevon Porter, and Luke Northweather often found themselves cross-matched on wings, tasked with navigating flares or pindowns in the slot. For bigger bodies, locking, trailing, and getting skinny over those screens is a difficult ask.

The shots we’re seeing are the tax bill that comes for making life difficult at the rim. In raw volume, MU isn’t the worst offender. Per Synergy, the Tigers allow 8.2 unguarded threes per game in the half-court, ranking 29^th among high-major programs. It’s also in line with SEC peers like Vanderbilt and LSU. The difference is what happens next. The Commodores surrender 1.041 points per shot on those looks. LSU checks in at 0.989.

That’s where randomness becomes infuriating.

Living with those jumpers is justifiable, assuming a team remains stingy inside. For much of non-con play, the Tigers have. Beyond their rim defense, MU ranks 40^th in Division I by allowing 46.1 percent shooting inside the arc. It’s also tracking toward its best defensive rebound rate of Gates’ tenure.

Now, it’s fair to question whether that profile holds up against SEC competition. MU built its profile against a slate littered with low-majors, many of which rely on a single shot creator and undersized front courts. The picture changes quickly in losses. The Tigers allow 1.292 points per rim attempt, a figure that would rank 324^th nationally.

Still, it’s easy to grasp why MU sticks with its rationale, because the SEC is still a habitat where confrontations unfold at the cup. Seven SEC teams rank inside the top 50 nationally for rim efficiency. By contrast, seven of its teams rank outside the top 250 in efficiency on open threes, with LSU, Florida, Mississippi State, and Auburn all below No. 300. Since the SEC expanded, it has never finished better than 18^th nationally in three-point percentage.

Unpopular as it sounds, there’s evidence to suggest MU’s performance should stabilize over time.

Unfortunately, that doesn’t resolve a deeper tension. Again, MU was once willing to trade some threes for the sake of creating turnovers and tipping possession math its way. This season, the scales have shifted. MU is currently tracking toward the lowest turnover and steal rates under Gates. Transition opportunities haven’t evaporated, but they do thin out in losses. For the Tigers, those opportunities are worth 1.3 points – roughly the same value as the open threes they concede.

Let’s tie some strands together.

MU chooses to limit point-blank looks and live with some jumpers. But should that interior defense soften and open threes keep dropping, the Tigers might not be able to offset the cost. Further complicating matters, the lineups assembled to choke off the paint might also constrict spacing on the offensive end.

Accepting that toll only works if it’s offset elsewhere.

One possible solution is applying more pressure. Rolling out an aggressive press – albeit in limited doses – can juice MU’s turnover rate. And when dropping back into man-to-man, the Tigers allow just 0.627 PPP, per Synergy data. Would that still mean allowing some threes? Almost certainly. But the hope would be that those triples aren’t enough to overcome what Mizzou siphons off.

The ire at MU’s defense around the arc is understandable. But again, they represent a compromise. Against some weaker opposition, it’s panned out, but as Florida pulls into town, we’re going to see whether it withers under sustained scrutiny.

As SEC play whirs up, MU won’t be judged solely on whether it’s gifting open jumpers. Its success hinges on whether the benefits of that choice outweigh the cost. And if the loss to Illinois is bellwether, the bill might be too steep to absorb.